Why the United States Requires the Upcoming Aerial Supremacy Battlecraft for its Air Force
Today, the United States encounters a set of national security dangers that it's never experienced before. Countries like China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are playing for high stakes, and America's very existence might be at risk soon. Given the extreme gravity of these hazards, it's essential to draw insights from the last major war that America triumphantly concluded - Operation Desert Storm. The key to that victory lay in swiftly attaining air supremacy through offensive counter-air strikes against a diverse set of crucial enemy targets using covert, infiltrating aircraft. This strategy remains as applicable today, albeit the adversaries have changed. As such, it's crucial for the United States Air Force to keep investing in its upcoming air dominance (NGAD) infiltrating counter-air (PCA) aircraft, alongside mission types such as the uninhabited collaborative combat aircraft (CCA) and the B-21 bomber.
The effectiveness of the Desert Storm aerial campaign served as a wake-up call worldwide. The revelation that stealth aircraft could deploy precision weapons anywhere, anytime, even in heavily defended combat spaces, represented a groundbreaking development.
The Baghdad area's air defenses in 1991 were the most robust, deadly, and comprehensive in history. Many tend to overlook that Iraq possessed the fourth-largest military globally at the time of the conflict and had recently emerged from an eight-year war with Iran. Just 24 hours after the initial air assaults, Iraq had been laid bare, and the entire country became exposed to the formidable allied aerial armada that ensued, making Iraq's military powerless and facilitating the joint forces' expulsion of it from Kuwait in a mere 43 days. This underscores the strength of stealth, as the F-117 - the first operational stealth attack aircraft - conducted less than 2% of the total combat sorties during Desert Storm but struck over 40% of the target bases.
China took notice of these outcomes. They analyzed the strategy, tactics, techniques, and procedures we employed to achieve our objectives against Iraq. China deduced that their strategy to preemptively hinder the main component of U.S. military superiority - American airpower - was to employ defenses structured in a manner known as anti-access/area denial (A2/AD).
Air defense challenges and technology have progressed significantly beyond the level faced in Desert Storm. Nonetheless, our offensive capabilities have also evolved. Stealth is not a fixed capability; it has undergone marked advancements, combined with advancements in electronic warfare technologies and real-time battlespace understanding, enabling us to recognize, circumvent, or destroy threats. The world recently witnessed this capacity in action, when Israel's Air Force deployed its F-35s (developed in the United States) to penetrate the core of Iran and not only evade but destroy numerous of its advanced Russian-built surface-to-air missile defenses.
China, which the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) labels its "pacing challenge," poses an even greater threat. China has pursued capabilities specifically designed to reduce the effectiveness of stealth, while simultaneously developing their own stealth aircraft based on U.S. jets. Strategic thinkers know how to neutralize Chinese countermeasures, but they require the necessary equipment to execute it.
Stealth is not a dichotomous function that works or does not. Stealth, more accurately referred to as "low observability," significantly decreases risk. It enhances the probability of both penetration and survivability against enemy air defenses by challenging every element of an adversary's kill chain. Even when an opponent improves their ability to detect low-observable aircraft, stealth remains an attractive attribute because it still makes it more challenging to defend against such aircraft. Moreover, technological advancements in low observability have significantly surpassed the advanced features already present in the F-22 and the F-35.
The Air Force and industry are developing subsequent generation combat aircraft. These advanced capabilities have long been conceived as the cornerstone for the Air Force's infiltrating counter-air (PCA) aircraft, which forms part of the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) family of systems. The idea is to leverage a range of capabilities, particularly uninhabited aircraft known as collaborative combat aircraft (CCA), in unison to achieve air superiority. This subsequently enables critical mission functions like conventional strategic attacks through the next-generation B-21 stealthy bomber. However, to fully realize the benefits of advanced technology, we need to invest in it.
The PCA combat aircraft provides the advanced stealth, electronic warfare, data fusion, and computational power that offers a skilled pilot the informational edge required to penetrate sophisticated enemy air defenses most effectively. The symbiosis of stealth and information, together with the decision superiority only a human can provide, transforms battlespace awareness into superior initiative and maneuver. This represents the true asymmetric advantage the United States needs in future high-end conflicts and will enable the defeat of any adversary air defense system. CCA will perform components of this mission in a teamed manner with inhabited PCA aircraft.
This is a prudent strategy. However, the U.S. Air Force has temporarily halted development of the inhabited PCA element of NGAD to reassess its effectiveness. Discussions have ranged from forging ahead as planned, to redesigning the design, altering the planned program, or even abandoning it in favor of a completely different approach. This analysis may prove beneficial if used to reflect before investing billions in the development and production of a subsequent generation high-speed, low-observable counter-air aircraft that can deliver multiple mission capabilities while penetrating the most formidable adversary air defense environments.
There's alarm that the pause in military upgrades might be excessively influenced by budget constraints. Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall hinted at this in recent comments. The fact is, the Air Force has been significantly underfunded for decades—receiving over $1.3 Trillion less than the Army and $900 Billion less than the Navy in the 20 years following the 9/11 attacks. The Air Force continues to lose combat aircraft at a faster rate than it can replace them. At some point, the Air Force reaches a limit where it can't do more with less, and the time for rebuilding has come.
China has modernized its defenses, and the U.S. must follow suit with its planned improvements. This is the cost of maintaining world power status. We cannot prevail in war without air superiority, enabling us to strike crucial enemy targets as necessary. If people consider the expense of victory high, they should contemplate the cost of defeat even more.
An intelligent choice will prioritize aircraft and supporting systems that offer the best value. This differs from the least expensive option based on individual aircraft unit cost. Overemphasizing individual aircraft unit cost as the primary metric ignores the full spectrum of a weapon system's capabilities and utility. Cost-per-effect is a more enlightening measure, assessing the complete range of abilities needed to achieve a desired outcome, not just the initial price tag. For instance, during Operation Desert Storm, one F-117 could achieve what 19 non-stealth aircraft would have, making the F-117 a more cost-effective and responsible choice from both a warfighting and financial perspective. The stealth multiplier of the F-22 and F-35 is anticipated to be around double that of the F-117, and for the NGAD PCA, even higher. An aircraft deemed "cheap" could end up being quite costly if it requires a larger number to accomplish the task, or catastrophic if cost concerns hinder mission success.
The decision about the NGAD PCA is crucial because it impacts not just air combat, but the entirety of our combat command's joint warfighting strategies. A naval vessel, ground forces, space and cyber facilities, and various air capabilities can't survive without air superiority. The NGAD PCA's role in the air superiority equation is particularly fundamental due to its focus on long-range air superiority, empowering deep-penetrating strategic attacks. This was a crucial consideration when the Air Force was developing its advanced B-21 bomber—the B-21 and the NGAD PCA were intended to work together in a holistic approach. A family functions best when all members are present.
Warfare has always been an interplay of action and reaction. The side that remains stagnant in this dance will lose. That's why the first major decision of the new Trump administration's Secretary of the Air Force should be to push forward with the planned development of the penetrating counter-air aircraft component of its next-generation air dominance system of systems. Accordingly, Congress must approve the necessary funding.
The implications of these two decisions for the nation's security and prosperity are profound. NGAD PCA is a vital component for the U.S. to control the battlefield initiative against potential adversaries, as we did during Desert Storm. Failing to do so would force us into a reactive posture with a high probability of engaging in an attrition-focused campaign—an outcome we're unlikely to win, especially against China. In this sense, it's useful to remember that the only thing more expensive than a first-rate Air Force is a second-rate Air Force.
- The strategy employed during Operation Desert Storm, resulting in swift air supremacy, serves as a model for the United States Air Force in its pursuit of the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program.
- The revealed effectiveness of stealth aircraft in Desert Storm, particularly the F-117, has prompted countries like China to develop countermeasures, underscoring the importance of continued advancements in this technology.
- The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) acknowledges China as a "pacing challenge," as China has been working on reducing the effectiveness of stealth and developing their own stealth aircraft.
- The planned development of the NGAD's infiltrating counter-air (PCA) aircraft, in conjunction with the B-21 bomber and uninhabited collaborative combat aircraft (CCA), is crucial for maintaining and improving air superiority against advanced adversary air defense systems.
- Maintaining air superiority is essential for the success of joint warfighting strategies, as naval vessels, ground forces, space and cyber facilities, and various air capabilities depend on it for survival.
